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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
000O000

--

LLOYD E. LISH, J R . ,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 14111

DEAN COMPTON,
Defendant /Appellant.
000O000

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff /Respondent, Lloyd E . Lish,
J r . , against the Defendant/Appellant, Dean Compton, for damages which
he sustained as the result of a contract for the sale of wheat which was
breached by Defendant.
The parties will be referred to herein as they appear in the
lower court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The t r i a l of the case was held in the District Court of Box
Elder County on the 13th and 14th days of February, 1975 before the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen with a jury.

The case was submitted to the

jury on Special Verdict and on February 14, 1975 they returned the Verdict

answering the Interrogatories in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
f

The Defendant made an oral Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding

•li-

the Verdict which was denied and Judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiff
ip

on April 28, 1975.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

*
m

The Plaintiff seeks to have the Judgment of the District Court
affirmed.

*
m

STATEMENT OF FACTS
•

-aa

This action a r i s e s out of a contract which Plaintiff, Lloyd E . Lish,
i

J r . , claims he entered into with the Defendant, Dean Compton, on August 2, 1973
whereby Defendant agreed to sell and Plaintiff agreed to buy 15, 000 bushels of red

i

wheat "as i s " at $3. 30 per bushel. Defendant denied that the contract was entered^
into and, additionally, asserted the Statute of Frauds as a defense.

m

(R. 204,
•

•

•

Jury Instruction #4)
Both parties testified that a telephone conversation occurred
between them on August 2, 1973 wherein they discussed the sale of 15,000 bushels
of wheat from Defendant to Plaintiff.

It was the Defendants contention that only

one conversation occurred between the parties on this date and that even though
the sale of the wheat was discussed, no contract was entered into.

§

I
i

f

(R. 132, 133,
i

142) Conversely, the Plaintiff testified that two telephone conversations occurred
between the parties on this date and in the first conversation the price of wheat

|
fl

was discussed and Defendant made mention of the fact that some of his neighbors
had received $3.25 per bushel for comparable wheat at this time.

Plaintiff

t

further testified that in the second conversation an oral contract was entered into *
for the sale of 15, 000 bushels of red wheat "as i s " at $3.30 per bushel.

(R. 15-18)

In reviewing the telephone log of the Defendant, it confirmed the fact that
two calls were made between Defendant and Plaintiff on the date in question.
(R. 144, Exhibit #13)
On or about August 3, 1973 the Plaintiff prepared a written
confirmation of the contract which contained the following: "red wheat,
rye mix. ..15,00 bushels, $3. 30 per bushel, as i s . " (R. 19, Exhibit #2)
This confirmation was mailed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant on or about
August 14, 1973 and was received by the Defendant in the mails in the afternoon of August 15, 1973. (R. 27, Exhibit #3)
Following the conversation between Plaintiff and Defendant on
August 2, 1973, the Plaintiff contacted Pillsbury Mills Company in Ogden,
Utah on the same date and entered into an oral contract with them for the
sale of 15, 000 bushels of red wheat "as i s " at $3.45 per bushel.

This contract

was evidenced by a written confirmation which was prepared by Pillsbury
Mills Company on or about August 2, 1973 and was received by the Plaintiff
some days thereafter.

(R. 19, Exhibit #1)

From the 2nd through the 14th days of August, 1973 the price of
#1 red wheat on the Ogden grain market increased from $3. 63 per bushel to
$4. 37 per bushel.

(R. 35-40, Exhibit #4) Both the Plaintiff and the

Defendant, as well as Mr. Rudolph Globoker, an employee of Pillsbury
Mills Company, Ogden, Utah, testified that such a sharp fluctuation in this
short a period of time was highly unusual and nothing comparable to this
had previously occurred.

(R. 41, 91, 150)

The Defendant, Dean Compton, was aware of the sharp increase
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of the price of wheat during this period and on August 15, 1973 he telephoned
the Plaintiff, Lloyd E . Lish, J r . , for the ostensible purpose of requesting that
Plaintiff haul his wheat from his farm in Idaho to Ogden, Utah. As soon as this
request was made, the Plaintiff interjected and told the Defendant that, "You
have no wheat, ! ! and that he had resold it to the Pillsbury Mills Company and
inquired whether or not the Defendant had received the written confirmation*
The Defendant replied that he had not received the confirmation at that time.
(R. 29-30, 133-134) During this or a second conversation on the same date,
Mr. Lish testified that Mr. Compton told him he could "get out" of his contract
with the Pillsbury Mills Company and Mr. Lish responded that he did not think
he could, however, if Pillsbury Mills Company would be willing to release him
from his contract, which he intended to perform, he would be glad to r e l e a s e
Mr. Compton.

(R. 30) He made the request that Mr. Compton contact the

representatives of Pillsbury on that day and Mr. Compton met and discussed the
matter with them in Ogden, Utah. The Defendant was advised by the r e p r e s e n tatives of Pillsbury that Mr. Lish did in fact have a contract with them and that
they intended to enforce the same. (R. 146-147) M r . Rudolph Globoker, who
was present during the conversation, testified that M r . Compton said he did
not sign a contract with Mr. Lish and that he "couldn f t sustain a $19, 000 l o s s . "
(R. 89-90)
Mr. Compton concedes that after he returned to his home on
August 15, 1973 he received the written confirmation from Mr. Lish and that he
did not send a written rejection of the same to Plaintiff.

(R. 103)

Both Plaintiff and Defendant testified that in the spring and early

s u m m e r of 1973 they had entered into a verbal contract or contracts
whereby Mr. Compton agreed to sell and Mr. Lish agreed to buy certain
wheat and barley.

(R. 43-45, 140-141) Mr. Compton acknowledges that the

contracts were verbal and that no written confirmations were received by
him. Additionally, a time lapse in excess of one month occurred from the time
the contract was entered into until the grain was hauled and payment
received by the Defendant and no writing existed until the completion of the
transaction to evidence the same. (R. 151) Another transaction between
the parties occurred on or about July 27, 1973 wherein Mr. Compton contacted
Mr. Lish by telephone and requested that he take a truck to Mr. Compton 1 s
farm in Little Mountain, Box Elder County, Utah, so he could deposit his
wheat in the same for storage.

Both parties testified that a sale was intended

to be made in the future but that no contract was entered into concerning the
price for the wheat at this time. After the truck was filled it was taken to
the grain mill in Ogden, Utah for storage.

(R. 141) On or about September 3,

1973 and following Mr. Compton's failure to deliver the. 15, 000 bushels of
red wheat at $3, 30 per bushel to Mr. Lish, the parties entered into an oral
contract for the sale of the wheat. Mr. Compton concedes that he sold the
wheat to Mr. Lish at this time at $3. 30 per bushel, notwithstanding the fact
that the price of wheat at that point in time had increased by approximately
$1. 00 per bushel.

(R. 153-154) It was the Plaintiffs testimony that the

Defendant told him to apply the 1, 000 bushels of wheat to the 15, 000 bushel
contract and the settlement statement which he proposed at the completion
of the transaction verifies this. (R. 59-60, Exhibit #7)
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The Defendant is the owner of farms in Cassia County, Idaho
and Box Elder County, Utah. His occupation for the past 20 to 25 y e a r s has
been in raising and selling farm commodities, principally wheat.

He concedes

that the commodities which he r a i s e s a r e produced primarily for r e s a l e and that
he has been engaged in the selling of grain for the 20 to 25 year period.

He sells m

grain both to grain merchandisers such as Mr. Lish and also directly to grain

m

m
storage facilities or m a r k e t e r s which a r e located in Ogden, Utah. He also keeps
himself apprised of the fluctuation of the price of grains and personally handles
all of his business transactions. Additionally, the Defendant admits he has

m

m
m
1

"merchandised" grain by entering into a "future contract" for grain not yet

m

produced.

m

(R. 100-103)

m

The evidence disclosed that the Defendant, Dean Compton, failed
ii

to perform his contract with the Plaintiff, other than for delivery of the 1, 000
bushels as set forth above. It also indicates that the Plaintiff performed his

m

•
i

contract with Pillsbury Mills Company which resulted in substantial losses to
him because of the increased price of wheat at the time of the breach.

(R. 59,

81)

I
«
*
i

The jury was instructed as to the contentions of each of the parties
i

and as to the applicable law and the case was submitted to them on Special Verdict J
(R. 204-211) A unanimous Special Verdict was returned by the jury which

*
i

provided as follows:
"We the jury find from a preponderance of the
evidence in this case the following answers to
the questions propounded to us:

«
*
i

" 1 . Has the defendant admitted in his testimony
or otherwise in court that an oral contract for
i
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the sale of the wheat was entered into with
plaintiff?
Yes

X

No

,f

2. Was an oral contract entered into between
plaintiff and defendant for the purchase and
sale of wheat?
Yes

X

No

" 3 . Was the defendant, on August 2, 1973, a
merchant as defined by the court's instructions?
Yes

X

No

M

4. Was a written confirmation received by the
defendant from the plaintiff within a reasonable
time?
Yes

X

No.

M

5. What was the market price of as is wheat
a s of August 15, 1973?
$4.25 per bushel. " (R. 212)
POINT I
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED BY THE
REVIEWING COURT ON APPEAL TO BE CORRECT.
There a r e numerous cases from the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, as well as other jurisdictions, supporting the general proposition of the law stated in Point I and no cases have been found by Plaintiff
stating a contrary position.
There is not only a presumption of validity on appeal of the
proceedings in the lower court, but the burden i s on the Defendant affirmatively to demonstrate e r r o r , and in the absence of such, the judgment must

-7-

be affirmed by the reviewing court.

Leithead v. Adair, 10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P . 2d

956; Coombs v. P e r r y , 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P . 2d 680. Not only a r e the p r e judgment proceedings in the trial court presumed to be correct, but every
reasonable contendment must be indulged in by the appellate court in favor of it. m
m

Burton v. Z . C . M . I . , 122 Utah 360, 349 P . 2d 516; Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu,

m

17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P . 2d 346; Petty v. Gindy Mfg. C o r p . , 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P. 2d
30.

m
m

The proposition of law set forth in Point I is binding upon the

m

appellate court whether the case was tried before a judge only or to a judge
sitting with a jury.

However, the presumption in favor of validity has m o r e weigh!

when the t r i a l court has given its approval to the determination of the jury as set
forth in its verdict by refusing to grant a new t r i a l or a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict to the losing party.

See Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391

a

P . 2d 430.
POINT II

" .

THE JURY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT ADMITTED IN HIS TESTIMONY

g

OR OTHERWISE IN COURT THAT AN ORAL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
THE WHEAT WAS ENTERED INTO WITH THE PLAINTIFF.

i

It is the contention of the Plaintiff that notwithstanding the denial
by the Defendant in his Answer that a contract was entered into, his testimony
in Court was sufficient to show that he had admitted the oral contract was entered,
into with the Plaintiff and the jury so found in answer to Interrogatory #1. The
legal proposition encompassing the Plaintiff's position concerning this issue
i s set forth in Section 70A-2-201, Utah Code Annotated, which provides in part

-8-

,

as follows:
"70A-2-201. Formal requirements Statute of F r a u d s . - (1) Except as otherwise
provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more
i s not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his
authorized agent or broker.

"(3) A contract which does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable

11

(k) if the party against whom enforcement
is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or
otherwise in court that a contract for sale was
m a d e . . . . " [Emphasis added]
As set forth above, if a party admits in his "pleadings, t e s t i mony or otherwise in court" the existence of an oral contract, the Statute
of Frauds will no longer be a defense to the s a m e . In this case, notwithstanding the Defendant's denial in his Answer that no contract was entered
into, there was considerable testimony by him that an oral contract was in
fact entered into. The Defendant testified that he had talked with the
Plaintiff about the sale of 15, 000 bushels of red wheat on August 2, 1973 at
$3. 31 per bushel. He further conceded that if he had received a written
confirmation from the Plaintiff at an earlier date after the conversation of
August 2, 1973, he would have considered the contract binding. His t e s t i mony in this regard is as follows:

-9-

n

Q - Okay. As I understand your testimony,
M r . Compton, you would have considered
that you had a binding contract with Mr. Lish
if you had received this confirmation in the
mail on an e a r l i e r date; is that c o r r e c t ?
"A - Yes, if an e a r l i e r date or a phone call.
n

Q - And had Mr. Lish sent you this confirmation
and you received it on an e a r l i e r date, you
would have considered the transaction binding;
i s that c o r r e c t ?
!I

A - In a reasonable length of time, y e s .

!I

Q - And because you didn!t receive it until the
15th you did not feel that you had a binding
contract with Mr. Lish; is that c o r r e c t ?
"A - That is right, yes. 1 1 (R. 149, 150)
The untenable position of the Defendant concerning this i s evidenced by the
following testimony:
!,

Q - Do you think your position would have been
different had the price of grain remained the
same or gone down between August second and
August 15?
11

A - I'm sure it would. " (R. 150)

Additionally, the Defendant totally acknowledges the contract by
his partial performance of the same in "selling" wheat to Mr. Lish for the
contract price of $3. 30 per bushel on September 3, 1973 when the market
price greatly exceeded this.
It was noted above that the Statute of Frauds does not purport
to deny the existence of an oral contract if proven, but only provides that
under some circumstances the same i s unenforceable.

In the case of

Cohn v. F i s h e r , 287 A. 2d 222, 118 N . J . Super 286 (1972) the Supreme Court
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of the State of New J e r s e y was presented with a case involving the same
statute as is in question h e r e .

The Court held that if a party admitted in

his deposition, answers or otherwise the existence of a contract, he could
not a s s e r t the Statute as a defense and stated as follows:
" This court is of the opinion that if a party
admits an oral contract, he should be bound
to his bargain. The statute of frauds was
not designed to protect a party who made an
oral contract, but rather to aid a party who
did not make a c o n t r a c t , . . . M [Emphasis
added]
Inasmuch as the jury has made a finding that the Defendant
admitted the existence of an oral contract as contended by the Plaintiff, i . e .
for the sale of 15, 000 bushels of red wheat "as i s " at $3.30 per bushel, the
contract is binding on the parties and there is no requirement that a "written
confirmation" be received or that the parties be deemed to be "merchants"
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE DEEMED MERCHANTS WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND A WRITTEN
CONFIRMATION OF THE ORAL CONTRACT WAS RECEIVED BY
DEFENDANT FROM PLAINTIFF WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.
It is Plaintiff's position that an oral contract existed for the
sale of the wheat by Defendant to Plaintiff and that the parties a r e deemed to
be "merchants" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code, and
that a "written confirmation" was received by Defendant from Plaintiff within
a reasonable time after the oral contract was entered into.
As was set forth in Point II, Section 70A-2-201 provides for
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some exceptions to the use of the Statute of Frauds as a defense and one such
exception is as follows:
"(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable
time a writing in confirmation of the contract
and sufficient against the sender is received
and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written
notice of objection to its contents i s given within
ten days after it is r e c e i v e d . . . . M [Emphasis
added]

m

*
m

m
*
m

As was noted in the Statement of Facts, the Defendant had engaged

i

m
in the business of raising and selling grain for approximately 20 to 25 y e a r s at
i

his farms located in Cassia County, Idaho and Box Elder County, Utah.

The

*

farm commodities raised by him were produced principally for r e s a l e .

He

*
i

also stated that he had dealt with grain merchandisers such as the Plaintiff
. f

during this period, as well as directly with grain mills and storage facilities
in Ogden, Utah. He kept himself apprised of the fluctuating p r i c e s of grains
and handled his business transactions personally.

Additionally, the Defendant

states that he has "merchandised 11 in the grain business:
"A - Yes. I'm hesitating; I want to be sure I
get the gist of the question. I've sold directly
to mills and I have had merchandisers or
dealers haul it for me to those places for storage
and put in my name, and then I have made the
deal and the settlement at a l a t e r date. I have
also merchandised where I have made a contract
ahead of time, a future contract, before the grain
is produced or before it i s harvested, and with
grain m e r c h a n d i s e r s . ! l (R. 101-102)
In Instruction #6 the Court instructed the jury as to who would be
deemed a "merchant 11 within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code as
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i

set forth in Section 70A-2-104 which provides as follows:
,r

(l) 'Merchant' means a person who deals in
goods of the kind or btherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom
such knowledge or skill may be attributed
by his employment of an agent or broker
or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill.!'
The jury, in answer to Interrogatory #3 found the Defendant on August 2,
1973 was a "merchant" as defined in the Court's Instruction.
In the case of Campbell v. Yokel, 313 N. E.2d 628, 20 Ill.App.3d
702 (1974) the Illinois Supreme Court was presented with the question of
whether a person who is engaged in the farming business could be a "merchant"
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. In holding that the
Defendants were "merchants" the Court stated as follows:
"The defendants in the instant case have
admitted in discovery depositions that
they have grown and sold soybeans and
other grains for several y e a r s . They
have sold to the plaintiffs and to other
grain companies in the past. We believe
that a farmer who regularly sells his crops
i s a person ! who deals in goods of that kind.'
"The authors of the comments to the Uniform
Commercial Code state that the t e r m ' m e r chant 1 applies to a 'professional in business 1
rather than to a 'casual or inexperienced
seller or b u y e r . '
The defendants admittedly
were not 'casual or inexperienced' s e l l e r s .
We believe that f a r m e r s who regularly market
their crops a r e 'professionals' in that business
and are 'merchants' when they are selling
those crops.

-13-

f!

. . . Placing this small burden upon f a r m e r s
in certain instances lessens the possibility
that the statute of frauds would be used a s
an instrument of fraud. F o r example, assuming
that an oral agreement had been reached in the
instant case, that the f a r m e r s had received the
written confirmation signed by the plaintiffs and
that the f a r m e r s were not ' m e r c h a n t s , ! the
f a r m e r s would be in a position to speculate on a
contract to which the grain company was bound.
. . . Our holding reduces the possibility of this
type of practice in cases in which the f a r m e r is
a person who regularly sells crops of this kind
involved in the transaction at hand. !f [Emphasis
added]
Also, in the case of Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm., 15 U. C . C . 304

m

*
m
i

•
I
I

(Ohio App. 1973) a fact situation existed which is remarkably similar to the fact

M

situation in the instant case.

«

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had orally

i

agreed to sell him 15, 000 bushels of soybeans at $5. 00 per bushel to be picked
'1
up at Defendant's farm, but refused to perform the contract, notwithstanding the •
fact that a written confirmation of the same had been received by him and he had

•
i

failed to reject the same in writing.

The Plaintiff sustained damages when the

market price of soybeans increased approximately $1. 00 per bushel. In holding
that the Defendant was a merchant, the Court stated as follows:

I
i
f

i

"He would represent defendant as a simple
tiller of the soil, unaccustomed to the affairs
of business and the market-place. Farming
i s no longer confined to simple labor. Only
an agri-businessman may hope to survive.
This defendant was clearly familiar with farm
m a r k e t s and their operation and followed them
with some c a r e . F o r example, he was familiar
with the bean market in Cincinnati, as well as
that in his local community. In his many y e a r s
of farming, he knew that corn was sold for
varying p r i c e s , depending upon its moisture,
quality and condition, and admitted having some
idea that the same was true of beans. He had
-14-

f

•

sold some beans a number of years
before. n [Emphasis added]
On an application for rehearing, the Court affirmed its ruling and stated
as follows:
"While it is true that the t e r m s 'farmer 1
and 'merchant 1 are non synonymous, yet
neither are they mutually exclusive, and
each may possess some of the qualifications
of the other. If, as in our present case, a
farmer is chargeable with the knowledge or
skill of a merchant, he is required to act
accordingly. , f
The only case cited by Defendant in his Brief to the effect that
a farmer may not be deemed to be a merchant within the meaning of the
Uniform Commercial Code is Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 395 S. W. 2d 555,
239 Ark. 962 (1965). It should be noted that in the instant case and in the
two cases set forth above, there was evidence introduced that the farmer
produced his commodities primarily for resale and had knowledge of their
value and markets relating to the same.

Conversely, in the Cook Grains

case, there was no evidence introduced that the Defendant had any knowledge
other than that of farming and the Court stated as follows:
11

There is not a scintilla of evidence in
the record, or proffered as evidence, that
appellee is a dealer in goods of the kind
or by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or a skill peculiar to the
practices of goods involved in the transaction,
and no such knowledge or skill can be a t t r i buted to him. I !
It should also be noted that the decision in the Cook Grains
case has been criticized by the leading treatise on the Uniform Commercial
Code. In Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code, Second Edition, Vol. 2
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at page 221, the editors, in referring to the case state as follows:
11

• . * If the f a r m e r customarily sells the
type of farm commodities in q u e s t i o n . . .
there is no reason why he should not be
deemed to be a m e r c h a n t . . . . "
As was noted by the p r i o r authorities, there i s no logical or
legal reason why a person who has the requisite knowledge concerning sales
of certain commodities, even though he may also be a f a r m e r and produce
the conamodities sold by him, may not be deemed to be a "merchant 11 within
the Uniform Commercial Code. In this instance the Defendant clearly was
knowledgeable about the sale of the commodity in question and had a considerable amount of expertise on the subject matter and should be bound by
his contracts as was the Plaintiff.
The second c r i t e r i a for the provisions of this exception to the
Statute of Frauds i s that a "written confirmation" be sent and received by
the Defendant within a reasonable time after the orial contract was entered
into on August 2, 1973. The "written confirmation" was received on
August 15, 1973 and the jury found that this was within a "reasonable t i m e . "
(R. 105, 212)
The jury was instructed as to what was meant by a "reasonable
time" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section
70A-1-204 provides in part as follows:
"(2) What i s a reasonable time for taking
any action depends on the nature, purpose
and circumstances of such action
"
The Court further inforxned the jury that in determining what i s a reasonable
time, they could take into account the course of dealing between the parties
-16-

which is defined in Section 70A-1-205, Utah Code Annotated.

(Instruction

#7, R. 207)
The only evidence of what constitutes a "reasonable time"
was the testimony of the Plaintiff to the effect that there was no unusual
or undue delay in sending the written confirmation.

(R. 80)

Additionally, as was set forth in the Statement of F a c t s , the
sharp increase in the price of wheat during the elapsed time in question had
not occurred on any previous occasion and was totally unexpected by the
parties.
In the instant case the prior dealings between the parties
occurred from approximately March or April through July of 1973 wherein
oral agreements were entered into whereby Defendant agreed to sell and
Plaintiff agreed to buy certain wheat and barley.

These contracts were

entered into orally and no written confirmations of the same were sent by
Plaintiff to Defendant.

Additionally, a time lapse in excess of one month

existed from the time the contracts were entered into until the Defendant was
paid and no written evidence of the contract existed until this time. In view
of the foregoing, it can scarcely be contended by the Defendant that a practice
had been established whereby he should have received a written confirmation
of the oral contract prior to the lapse of 13 days which occurred in the instant
case.
In the case of Azevedo v. Minister, 471 P . 2d 661 (Nev. 1970)
the Nevada Court, in a case involving the sale of 1, 500 tons of hay, addressed
itself to the question of what was a "reasonable time" under the same
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statutes a s involved in the instant case, and stated as follows:
"4.

The * Reasonable Time 1 Factor.

"Subsection 2 of NRS 104.2201 provides that
the confirming memorandum must be sent
within a reasonable time after the oral
contract is made. Appellant argues that the
delay of 10 weeks
as a matter of law is an
unreasonable time. We do not agree. What
is reasonable must be decided by the t r i e r of
facts under all the circumstances of the case under
consideration*... f l [Emphasis added]

m

*
m

•
1

«

F o r other cases holding that what i s a "reasonable time" within the meaning of
- •
the Uniform Commercial Code is a question for the t r i e r of fact, see Robinson v.
Jonathan Logan Financial, 277 A. 2d 115 (1971); and Irrigation Motor & Pump
Co. v. Belcher, 483 P . 2d 980 (1971).

g

*
M

The Defendant, in his Brief, cites some c a s e s to the effect that
what is a reasonable time may be determined by the Court a s a matter of law.
However, these cases do not deal with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial

*
•
i

Code and even if they did, the legal principle therein i s only applicable if the
surrounding circumstances during the time period a r e not in dispute as they
were in the instant case.

In this regard the case, of Hill v. Hobart, 16 Maine

164 (1836) cited by the Defendant provides as follows:
"
But -where what is a reasonable time
depends upon certain other controverted
points, or where the motives of the party
into the question, the whole i s necessarily
to be submitted to a jury, before any
judgment can be formed, whether the time
was or was not reasonable."

,

i

t

<
<
{
i

The Defendant admits that no written rejection of the written
confirmation was sent by him to the Plaintiff. However, in his Brief he argues
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that the oral statement to the Plaintiff that he did not intend to perform
eliminates the necessity of the written rejection.

This contention has been

made by him without any supporting statutory or case law and i s clearly
without m e r i t .

In this regard, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada

in the Azevedo case, supra, discussed the purpose for the adoption of the
particular provision of the Uniform Commercial Code requiring that a
written rejection be sent and stated as follows:
"While §2-201(2) of the Code is entirely
new in the commercial law field, its
only effect is to eliminate the defense of
the statute of frauds. The party alleging
the contract still has the burden of proving
that an oral contract was entered into before the
written confirmation. The purpose of the subsection of the Code is to rectify an abuse that
had developed in the law of commerce. The
custom arose among business people of confirming oral contracts by sending a letter of
confirmation. This letter was binding as a
memorandum on the sender, but not on the
recipient, because he had not signed it. The
abuse was that the recipient, not being bound,
could perform or not, according to his whim
and the market, whereas the seller had to
perform. Obviously, under these circumstances,
sending any confirming memorandum was a
dangerous practice. Subsection (2) of Section
2-201 of the Code cures the abuse by holding a
recipient bound unless he communicates his
objection within 10 days. f l
The foregoing principle was also discussed in the case of
Tiffany v. W. M.K. Transit, 493 P.2d 1220, 16 Ariz.App. 415 (1972). The
Court quoted with approval from an article in the Arizona Law Review
which provided as follows:
11

... 'Under subsection (2).. • , when a letter
of confirmation is employed between merchants,
-19-

the recipient must give written notice of
objection within ten days after receipt or he
is precluded from setting up the Statute of
F r a u d s . . . . Buyers and sellers should confirm
all oral contracts by letter and should reply
immediately (accepting or rejecting) upon
receipt of such memoranda from the other
party.! M
The jury has found, based upon substantial evidence, that the
parties entered into the contract as claimed by the Plaintiff for the sale of
wheat and that the Defendant was a "merchant 11 within the meaning of the
Uniform Commercial Code and that a written confirmation was received by
the Defendant within a "reasonable time 1 ' thereafter.

Consequently, the

Statute of Frauds is not a bar to the Plaintiff's claim.
POINT IV
THE COURT CORRECTLY COMPUTED THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
It is the position of the Plaintiff that the damages sustained by him
is the difference between the contract price of $3. 30 p e r bushel and the price
on the date of the breach of $4.25 p e r bushel. This legal principle is contained
in Section 70A-2-713, Utah Code Annotated, which provides as follows:
"Buyer's damages for nondelivery or repudiation. (1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with
respect to proof of market price (section 70A-2723), the m e a s u r e of damages for nondelivery or
repudiation by the seller i s the difference between
the market price at the time when the buyer learned
of the breach and the contract p r i c e . . . n [Emphasis
added]
The jury found in answer to Interrogatory #5 that the m a r k e t price of "as is 11
red wheat on August 15, 1973 was $4.25 per bushel which was based upon
-20-

considerable evidence from the Plaintiff and from the representative of
Pillsbury Mills Company.
The damages awarded were based upon the difference in the
two prices of $.95 per bushel multiplied by the number of bushels called
for in the contract, i . e . 15,000. However, the Defendant was given credit
for the 1, 000 bushels which he had delivered in September of 1973 at the
contract price of $3. 30 per bushel.

This computation of damages was

proper and in accordance with, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code set forth above.
Some contention is made by the Defendant in his Brief that
the damages assessed against him should be limited to the 12, 000 bushels
of wheat which he actually produced from the farm in Cassia County, Idaho
in 1973. This argument is made without any supporting authority and it
would be totally inconsistent to allow the Defendant who had denied that a
contract was entered into to change his position at this point to claim that
the contract was to be of a different quantity or was to be an "amount
produced 11 contract.

In Instruction #4 the Court advised the jury of the

contention of the Plaintiff concerning the contract as follows:
"The plaintiff alleges that on the second
day of August, 1973, the parties entered
into a contract wherein the defendant agreed
to sell and the plaintiff agreed to buy 15, 000
bushels of red wheat at $3.30 per b u s h e l , . . . "
The jury found in answer to Interrogatories #1 and #2 that the contract as
claimed by the Plaintiff was entered into between the p a r t i e s .
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POINT V
THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS
PROPERLY DENIED.
f

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has repeatedly ruled that
the law i s in favor of the submission of disputed i s s u e s to the jury and of

*
*
i

supporting their verdict when the same has been rendered.

See Smith v.

Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P . 2d 541. It has also been held that it i s the

•
.

fundamental right of litigants to have their disputed issues submitted to the jury •
i

and that if the Courts were ready to override their jury verdicts when they
i

disagreed with them, the right of t r i a l by jury would be effectively denied. In

•

this regard, the Court in the case of Lund v. Phillips Pet. C o . , 10 Utah 2d 276,

g

351 P.2d 952, stated as follows:
i

"It is to serve the policy of safeguarding
the right of t r i a l by jury that in doubtful
cases the doubts a r e resolved in favor of
submitting the case to the jury; and in favor
fl
of supporting the verdict when rendered

•
f

<
i

In this case the parties have had an opportunity to present their

(

cases to the Court and the jury who answered a Special Verdict finding in favor
i

of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant on conflicting evidence and the Court
declined to upset the verdict of the jury.

In view of the foregoing, it seems

that the following much quoted provision is applicable:
11

'Anyone acquainted with the practical operation cf a t r i a l by jury and the human factors
that must play a part therein is aware that it
would be almost impossible to complete a t r i a l
of any length without some things occurring with
which counsel, after the case is lost, can find
fault and, in zeal for his cause, all quite in good
faith, magnify into e r r o r which to him and the
-22-

'

losing parties seems blameable for their failure
to prevail. However, from the standpoint of
administering evenhanded justice the court must
dispassionately survey such claims against the
over-all picture of the trial, and if the parties
have been afforded an opportunity to fully and
fairly present their evidence and arguments upon
the issues, and the jury has made its determination thereon, the objective of the proceeding has
been accomplished. And the judgment should
not be disturbed unless it is shown that there is
e r r o r which is substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that it appears that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different
in the absence of such e r r o r . . . . f Hales v.
Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822"
CONCLUSION
Based upon the testimony of the Defendant, there was ample
justification for the finding by the jury that he had admitted "in his testimony
or otherwise in court" that the contract as claimed by the Plaintiff for the
sale of wheat was entered into.
The jury found that an oral contract was entered into, that
the Defendant was a "merchant" and that a written confirmation of the
contract was received by Defendant from Plaintiff within a "reasonable time"
thereafter as those t e r m s a r e defined in the Uniform Commercial Code and
there is no basis for upsetting its verdict.
Additionally, the Court correctly computed the measure of
damages as being the difference between the contract price of the commodity
and its price as of the date of the breach.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
J. ANTHONY EYRE
Kipp and Christian
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to
Omer J . Call, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 26 F i r s t Security Bank
Building, Brigham City, Utah 84302, this 8th day of September, 1975.
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